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CARR=RS.

The word "cars" in a Wisconsin Statute, giving a right of
action to railway employes injured by fellowa- "C-r" servant's negligence (L. 1893, C. 220), was held
to include hand-cars: Benson v. Chicago, St. P., Mf. & 0. R.
(Sup. Ct. of Minnesota), 77 N. W. 798.
A bought a mileage book, containing a clause of forfeiture
for use by any other than the purchaser, with money furnished
oadtre of by a ticket "scalper," paid him for the part she
nmd-.r

mfmhe Dwo
Irskw

had used, and delivered to him the unused portion. She afterwards attempted to take a second

trip on the same book, but in the meantime
another person had used it, and on evidence of this the railroad company had listed the ticket as forfeited. A was
accordingly compelled to surrender the book and pay fare
under pain of being put off the train. On action by A against
the railroad, A and the scalper agreed, in testifying, that no
authority to permit others to use the ticket had been given by
A. Held, that the ownership of the mileage was for the jury,
and that if the title to it remained in A, and she gave no license
to others to use it, the ticket was not forfeited. Judgment for
A affirmed. Mueller v. Chcago, B. & N. R. (Sup. Ct. of
Minnesota), 77 N. W. 566.
U"

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

An injunction against a criminal prosecution, in a state
Er"dmeart, court under a valid state law, of a bank officer for
auruai . embezzlement, cannot be granted by a Federal
RtCelvwo

maona E

court because the latter had previously obtained

jurisdiction in equity cases in which a receiver of

the bank had been appointed and the civil liability of such
officer was in litigation: Harkraderv. Wadley, 19 Sup. Ct. 14o.
In Howell v. .A1dler et al,91 Fed. 129, the Circuit Court of
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Appeals decides (I) A compiler and publisher of an annotated
SuittoProtect edition of the statutes of a state may copyright
Copyright, his work, and such copyright will cover and proInfringement tect such part of the contents as is the product of
by State
his own labor. (2) A suit to enjoin the publicaAuthority,
tion, distribution and sale of a similar work, on
Eleventh
Amendment the ground that it infringes such copyright, is not
a suit against the state within the purview of the Eleventh
Amendment, U. S. Const., because the matter for such publi-"
cation was prepared under direction of a state statute, and is
owned by the state and in its possession, and the defendants
are officers and agents of the state, and proceeding in accordance with such statute.
Board of Commissioners of Wilkes County v. Call (Supreme
Court of North Carolina), 31 S. E. 481, is a late ease of bond
The bonds were declared void,
Impairment of repudiation.
theObligation against the dissent of two justices, on various
of contracts technical grounds, among which was the fact that
the vote on the second reading of the act authorizing the
loan was not recorded in the journal of the legislature.
"There can be no bonaftde holders of unconstitutional obligations," says the court, "nor can ignorance of public statutes and legislative journals be deemed otherwise than wilful
or negligent."
A decision precisely similar to this (Union Bank v. Board
of Comr's, i i 9 N. C. 214, 25 S. E. 966) was held by District
Line of State Judge Purnell (Bank v. Board, 90 Fed. 7, E. D.
Dec Ions Held of N. C.) to govern onlyfor the future. Its applia ,Law'"
cation to contracts entered into previously was
considered by the learned judge unconstitutional, as being legislation impairing the obligation of contracts. Former decisions had established the law in North Carolina that "the
copy of an act, attested according to law by the presiding officers of the two houses of the legislature and filed in the office
of the Secretary of State," constituted "conclusive proof of
the enactment and contents of the statute of the state," not to
be attacked "by the legislative journals or in any other manner." This "law " of the state could not be " repealed " by
judicial decision so as to invalidate contracts already formed.
This decision of the Federal court goes very far, but not
farther than Pease v. Peck, i8 How. 599 (I855). In the latter
case the act in question was never passed by the legislature,
but was engrossed by a clerk's mistake. For a number of
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Continued).

years the state courts treated the statute as valid, but later discovered the error, and declared the law void ab imijo. This
decision, in its application to contracts entered into on the
faith of the original construction, was reversed by the United
States Supreme Court.
In .this connection especial interest attaches to the last Virginia coupon case, McCullough v. State of Virginia, 19 Sup.
ilmpirmentof Ct. 134. The Supreme Court of Virginia declared
omgation unconstitutional in toto the Act of 1871, which
by cht8o
made bond coupons receivable for state taxes and
In Judicial
coatr"on, gave rise to the whole brood of cases of which
writ of error this is the latest, and accordingly denied remedy
to s' cour to a bondholder, McCullough. The court, in
taking this action, made no mention of the Act of 1887, under
the authority of which the state officers refused to receive the
coupons in payment of taxes. Neverthless, the United States
Supreme Court granted a writ of error to the Supreme Court
of Virginia, on the ground that the latter's action impaired
the obligation of McCullough's contract. As Mr. Justice
Peckham points out, in his dissenting opinion, this furnishes
the first instance of the granting of such a writ under the
contract clause, where the state court had not upbheld a state
staute, which was alleged to impair the obligation of a contract. To be sure, the majority asserts this case to be practically giving effect to the Act of 1887, while not nominally
'doing so. But the view in the dissenting opinion seems the
more rational, and it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the
rule of Gelpke v. Dubuque has in this case been extended,
and that settled judicial construction of a state law is here
considered part of the statute for the purpose of giving jurisdiction by the subject-matter, just as before it had been considered part of the statute for the decision of a case, after the
Federal jurisdiction had been conferredy citizenship.
CONTRACTS.

In Moffett, Hodgkins & Clark Co. v. Rochester (Circuit
Court of Appeals), 91 Fed. 28, the plaintiffs filed a bill for a
Mistake,
rescission of a contract awarded to him for public
Rescission work, on the ground of mistake, in that they had
made an erroneous estimate of the cost of a certain tunnel
excavation by omitting to take into consideration certain
features of the work, thereby making his bid $27,000 less than
it should have been. The court dismissed the bill on the
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CONTRACTS (Continued).
ground that the alleged mistake lacked two elements .essential
to render it one for which rescission Would be granted; first,
it was not mutual, and, second, plaintiff was not free .from
negligence.
A and B entered into a written agreement to embark in a
joint venture in the purchase of stocks, B to furnish the capital
Usury,
to carry on the business, to share equally in the
Loan
profits, and in case of loss to be reimbursed not
only to the extent of the full amount of his investment, but to
receive a sum in excess of legal interest thereon. Held, it not
being shown that the agreement was a device to conceal a loan.
of money, that the contract was not usurious: Orviss v.
LEurtiss (Court of Appeals of New York), 52 N. E. 690.
4Jn appeal from a judgment against B on a bail bond, B
-contended that there was no consideration for the bond,
al.bond, inasmuch as C, for whose appearance the bond
Consideration was given, was at the time of his escape under

arrest for another offence. Held, affirming the judgment,
that the discharge from custody for the offence for which the
bail was given was sufficient consideration for the' bond,
though the offender was in custody for another offence until
his escape: Dunlap v. State (Supreme Court of Arkansas), 49
S. W. 349.
CORPORATIONS.

National Bank v. Illinois & W. Lumber Co., 77 N. W. 185
(Supreme Court of Wisconsin), is to be added to the list of
Stock issued decisions which recognize that it is only on the
In Exchange ground of fraudulent overvaluation of the propfor Property erty that the stock issued in exchange for it can

be treated by creditors as not fully paid. The court cites,
with approval, the well-known decision of the Supreme Court
of the United States in Coit v. Amalgamating Co., I i9 U. S.
343.
Ignoring for a moment the "corporate entity," we cannot
but regard stockholders as partners with limited liability.
Stock Sold at Hence, we conclude (I) that a stockholder who
SDiscount, has been induced by fraud to subscribe to stock,
Stockholder's has an equity of rescission against his associates;
igtto re-

scind for

(2) that his equity will not, however, avail against

Fraud
the legal right of a corporate creditor, who is in
substance the creditor of all who are stockholders when his
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CORPORATIONS (Continued).

debt accrues; (3) that the liability of a stoclholder to respond up to the par value of his stock is the same thing
(within limits) as the liability of the partner to respond for
firm debts to the full extent of his resources; (4) that as a
private agreement of indemnity is enforceable between partners, so an agreement that a stockholder shall not be liable
for the par of his stock is valid, except as against corporate
creditors; and, therefore, is not of such a character as to,
deprive him of his equity of rescission under the circumstances
above stated. This is all that there is (except a point of equity
pleading) in such a case as Barcus v. Gates, 89 Fed. 783
(Circ. Ct. of App. 4th Circ.). The c6urt, however, being
sadly hampered by the artificial reasoning to which long
familiarity with the "entity" has accustomed us, labors hard
to reach the proper result, and does so only after a toilsome
journey.
In Rowe v. Leudzld, 77 N. W. 153, the Supreme Court
of Wisconsin deals another blow at the obsolescent "trust
120"...,. fund theory" by remarking that "it is true that
pn meee. the mere fact of the insolvency of a corporation
a m-ctU
does not convert its property into a trust fund for
the benefit of all its creditors, so as to prevent one of them,
without fraud, from obtaining a preference by ordinary adversary proceedings." This must involve the concession that a
corporation may prefer a creditor. The court, however, refuses to recognize the right to prefer a director who is a
creditor. The case before the court was a case of trickery
and sharp practice upon the part of the favored director. It
is to be regretted that the court did not rest its decision on
the ground of fraud. It seems impossible to sustain the principle as broadly as the court undertook to state it.
Although the stock of his corporation was fully paid, a
Uhco.ibuU stockholder, who voluntarily discharged a cor,tepayeetporate debt, asserted an equity of contribution
E1 o
against his fellow-stockholders. The court deD
nied his right. Gorder v. Connor, 77 N. W. 383.

CRIMINAL LAW.

In Queen v. Ellis, [[899] I Q. B. 231, false representations
had been made in Glasgow, but the goods were obtained in
Jurisction, England. Held, that the offence consists in obFalse
taining the goods, and not in making false prePretences tences whereby they might be obtained, and,
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therefore, the English court had jurisdiction to try the charge
of obtaining goods by false pretences.
Who is a fugitive from justice was the question involved in
In re Haney, 55 Pac. 930, which was before the Supreme
Court of Washington. The petitioners were conFugitives
from Justice, victed of murder in Idaho, and sentenced to im-

Extradition,
Convicted
Persons in
Another State

prisonment in the penitentiary of that.state. In
going from the place of trial to the penitentiary,
in custody of an officer, they were compelled, by
the topographical condition of the country, to pass through
a portion of another state. When in this portion they applied
for their release on habeas corpus, on -the ground that the
officer had no authority to detain them in that state. Held,.
they were not fugitives from justice, but convicted persons
under a judgment of a court of a sister state to which full
faith must be given. Remanded to the custody of the officer.
EQUITY.

The case of Coons v. Chrstie, 53 N. Y. Suppl. 668, carries
the use of the injunction in labor disputes further than any
injunctions, case which has come to our notice. The court
Restraint would seem to hold that one may be restrained
on
by injunction from asking another to break his
Trade Unions contract with the plaintiff, thus not
only following the doctrine of Lumley v. Guy, 2 E. & B. 216, but preventing the breach of duty recognized in that case, by an
injunction. The court, however, put their decision on another
ground. The defendant had, as an officer of a union, ordered
the employes of the plaintiff to stop work. The decision
granting the injunction is apparently placed on the ground of
an organized interference with the plaintiff's business. This
idea underlies Mr. Justice Harlan's opinion in Arthur v. Oakes,
62 Fed. 321, where he held a strike in itself illegal as a combination to injure another. Compare, also, JFarmers'Loan and
Trust Co. v. North Pacftc R. R. Co., 6o Fed. 803. The principle
of law would seem to be that all combinations which injure the
business or property of another are unlawful. It need hardly
be pointed out that if actors and the injured party are competitors in trade, this principle is not law. Where the actors
are workmen, and the injured employers, it is in this country
rapidly tending to become law. Compare Allen v. Flood,
[1898] A. C. I ; Davisv. Engineers, 51 N. Y. Suppl. I8o; and
the opinion of Holmes, J., in Vcghlahan v. Gunter, 44 N. E.
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EQUITY (Continued).

(Mass.) l077. The second case deals with the principle of
Lumley v. Guy, the third with harm which one may do to
another with impunity, and Allen v. Flood, more or less with
both questions.
GUARANTY.

Ordinarily an agreement with a bank to be responsible for
the payment of notes of a third person which it may endorse,
is a continuing offer, which may be withdrawn as to
any subsequent notes by notice.

Home Savings

Bask v. Hosie, 77 N. W. (Mich.) 625, was a case of this kind,
where the directors of a company had executed their bond to
the bank for indorsements to be made during the ensuing
year. It was held, under all the circumstances, and especially because the bond was only a substitute for another, the
consideration for which had been executed, that it was not
revocable by notice, and, therefore, not by the death of one of
the obligors.
LeA 'gk Coal and Navigation Co. v. Blakeslee, 41 Atl. (Pa.)
992, decides that a guarantee of the validity of a signature
statuta g to a power on a stock. certificate is a contract from
Utatous the date thereof, and an action cannot be maintained upon it on proof of its forgery after seven years.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.

Iowa is one of those states where cruel and inhuman conduct must endanger life in order to constitute a ground for
Divorce,
divorce. Blair v. Blair, 76 N. W. (Ia.) 700, is
Crueland
a good illustration of how far such conduct may
Inhuman
go without authorizing the court to separate the
Treatment parties-even to hiring a man to compromise his
wife's chastity. The existence of such a case is a strong argument in favor of moderately liberal divorce laws.
Driver v. Driver,52 N. E. (Ind.),4o7, holds that, for a marcruety
ried man falsely to deny the paternity of his wife's
,child, is such cruelty as will entitle her to divorce.
INNKEEPERS.

In the case of Turner v. Stafford, 9 Pa. Super. Ct. 83, it
was decided that the absence of a guest all night
Guest,
Absence from from a room engaged by him at a hotel is not
Room,
such negligence on his part as will bar his right"
Negligence
to recover the value of property stolen.
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MASTER AND SERVANT.

Wabash R. Co. v. Keley, 52 N. E. (IIl.) 152, was a case in
which a railroad company had deducted a certain monthly
Hospitalfor sum from the wages of an employe for the purpose of maintaining a hospital for the care of inRailway
Employes,. jured employes. It was held that, so far as the
Management

management of the hospital was concerned, the

company was like any other principal, liable for the acts of its
agents, and hence liable to one who suffered an unnecessary
amputation by a surgeon, employed by the company, who was
under the influence of narcotics.
The general principle of the duty *ofa master to furnish his
servants with a safe place to work and proper tools, etc., is.
Safe Place to well settled. The difficulty in applying it is seen
work,
in Lake Erie & W. R. Co. v. Morrissey, 52 N. E.
Rilway
(I1.) 299. The plaintiff's ground of complaint
Track
was that the company had neglected its duty of
leveling the track at switching points, and that plaintiff had
been injured thereby. A judgment for plaintiff was affirmed
on the ground that there was evidence to go to the jury.
Plaintiff escaped the ordinary defence of having voluntarily
undertaken the risk in question by proving that it was his first
trip as conductor to that place.
MORTGAGES.
Webber v. Lawrence, 77 N. W. (Mich.) 266, is an instructive case. Lawrence, holding title to property subject to a
Assumption, $15,ooo mortgage in favor of Webber, deeded it
Defence
to Coming, who by the deed assumed the payment of the mortgage debt. A contemporaneous written
agreement disclosed, however, that the transaction was merely
to secure Coming for indorsing a note of Lawrence's, who,
by the agreement, was to retain possession of the" premises and apply the income to the payment of the loan and
mortgage. In a foreclosure suit by Webber. it is now held
that he is not entitled to a personal decree for deficiency
against Corning; he has no contract with him, himself, and
his right through Lawrence is subject to the defence that
could be set up in a suit brought by Lawrence himself, to wit,
that Lawrence had not performed his part of the contract.
See Garnsey v. Rogers, 47 N. Y. 233 ; Gaffney v. Hi k, 131
Mass. 124.
The familiar rule of negotiable paper, that its transfer carries with it an implied warranty that the paper is genuine, was.
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MORTGAGES (Continued).

applied in Waller v. Staples, 77 N. W. (Ia.) 570,
to a mortgage. The second-assignee of a mortgage was there held entitled to recover against the first the
loss accruing, by reason of the fact that the mortgage was a
forgery.
Assignment,
Warranty

Long v. Landman, 76 N. W. (Mich.) 374, is a recent illustration of the principle that, where an executor has obtained
mortgag by authority from a court to mortgage his testator's
Executor
estate, the mortgagee has a right to rely upon the
real facts set forth in the petition; and these facts, if sufficient to
confer jurisdiction on the court, cannot subsequently be denied by the heirs in a suit to foreclose the mortgage. If this
were not so, it would practically be impossible for an executor
to borrow any money on a mortgage.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
In an action against a city for maintaining a nuisance in
depositing, near the premises of the plaintiff, garbage gathered from the public streets, the court affirmed
Nuisance,
Liability
a judgment for plaintiff: City of Albany v. Slider,
The rule
(Appellate Court of Indiana,) 52 N. E. 626.
that a municipal corporation cannot escape liability for maintaining a nuisance, under the plea that the nuisance was created in the discharge of its duty to the public, is now well settled : Haag v. Commissioners, 6o Ind. 511 ; Petersburgh v.
Applegarth, 28 Gratt. 321 ; Brayton v. FallRiver, i3 Mass.
218; Hannibal v. Richards, 80 Mo. 530; Wood on Nuisances, sec. 742.
Electric Power Co. v. Mayor of City of New York, 55 N. Y.
Suppl. 460. In this case the electric company had illegally
Removal of erected wires upon housetops. The city authorisiectrewires ties cut down and removed the wires without
notifying the company to remove them. Held,
Illegally
that the city was liable for conversion in removing
Paced
the wires, although illegally placed, without notifying the
company, and without offering the company a reasonable opportunity for reclaiming them.
NEGLIGENCE.
The rules of law applicable to the case of Laidlaw v. Sage,
have at last been clearly enunciated by the New York Court

256
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NEGLIGENCE (Continued).
proximate
Cause,
Dynamite
Explosion,

of Appeals in 52 N. E. 679, and the result reached
is substantially the same as when the case was
first tried, and the complaint dismissed because

there was no connection or, at least, not the
necessary connection between the act of the defendant, Sage, and the injury of the plaintiff; in
other words, that the act of the defendant was not the proximate cause of the injury to the plaintiff. The facts of this long
protracted case were: In December of 1891, one Norcross
entered the office of Russell Sage, carrying in his hand a carpet
bag, and handed a" note to Sage which, in substance, stated
that there was ten pounds of dynamite in the bag, which, if
dropped on the floor would blow up eveiything in the place.
It then continued, "I demand $1,200,000, or I will drop the
bag." Sage parleyed with him, and Norcross, evidently
believing that Sage did not intend to comply with his demand,
caused the explosion to take place. Norcross was blown to
pieces, one of the clerks was killed, and everything in the office
was shaken up. The plaintiff entered the office a short time
after Norcross, but before the explosion, and claims that Sage
caught hold of him and moved him about the width of his
body, or about eighteen inches, thus bringing him between
Sage and Norcross, and he was in this position when the explosion took place. The plaintiff received a severe injury and
he brought this action for damages against Sage. At the first
trial the case was dismissed because there was, in the opinion
of the trial court, no relation of cause and effect. This was
reversed by the Supreme Court, they holding that no question
of proximate cause was involved. After four trials and the questions being passed upon by the Supreme Court three times,
the Court of Appeals decides that there was no relation of
cause and effect, and practically take the same grounds as the
original trial court, so that, after all these years of litigation,
the plaintiff's claim is practically dismissed. It is true that
the judgment was reversed and a new trial ordered, yet the
view that the court took of the evidence, puts an end, in all
probability, to the case, unless some new evidence is discovered. The court did not rest its opinion upon the question
of proximate cause alone, yet it is very apparent that that
was the determining factor in the decision, and it was based
upon the fact that plaintiff would have been injured if Sage had
not moved him, because everybody in the room was injured.
Use of a
Human Being
as a Shield
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PARTNERSHIP.

In order to enforce a partnership liability against one who
has, in fact, ceased to be a partner, it must, on principle, ap"Holding
pear that the plaintiff has been misled to his disOut"
advantage by the defendant's "holding out."
Whatever doubts may have been cast by the New York courts
upon the soundness of this proposition by the decision in
Pod/on v. Secor, 6i N. Y. 456, may be regarded as set at rest
by Bank v. Walker, 66 N. Y. 424, and by Lanier v. Miliken,
54 New York Suppl. 424. See the remarks of Gray, J., in
Thompson v. Bank, I II U. S. 530.
PIRADING AND PRACTICE.

The Court of Appeals of Colorado has decided that if a
sheriff's return of service be false, and not the result of any
misconduct of the plaintiff, its falsity may be
Sherff's
Return not shown by the .party injured, in a proceeding to
Concasilve vacate the judgment.* This is broadly contrary to
the old rule, that as between parties and privies the return of
the sheriff was conclusive, and that it could not be questioned,
except in an action against the officer for a false return. The
Ne-appr- court further held that the unauthorized appearance by
ance of an attorney for a defendant, without the
Att--Sy
latter's knowledge, does not confer jurisdiction.
These are definite rulings upon points of practical importance
that have been debated in other forums.
In this connection it is interesting to read the opinion of
Judge Mitchell, of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in
Pa.Deon Price v. Schaeffer, 161 Pa. 530, under the Ist SecUnder Art. 4,

tion of Art. 4, of the Constitution of the United

Sect. ,U.S States, where the position of the plaintiff in the
Constitution judgment, both by the organic law and by many

judicial interpretations, would seem to be very strong in an
action upon a judgment entered in the court of another state.
It was held, in this Pennsylvania case, that an affidavit of defence to such an action is sufficient which avers that the
appearance recited in the record of the judgment sued on was
merely constructive, and that, in fact, the defendant was not
served with process, did not appear, and had no knowledge of
the suit until recently, when demand was made, in Philadeldelphia, upon him for payment. See also Bodurtha v. Goodrk, 3 Gray, 5o8, in which it was held that, in the absence of
personal notice or service, a mere recital that the defendant
appeared by attorney was not absolutely binding, and did not
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preclude him from showing that the attorney was not retained
or authorized. Said Shaw, C. J.: "It would be reasoning in
a circle, and inconclusive, to say,. that the court had jurisdiction, because it was shown by their record that the defendant
appeared by attorney; and that they had authority to make
such record, binding upon him, because they had jurisdiction :"
Du Bois v. Clark, 55 Pac. 750REAL PROPERTY.

In Boyd v. Bloom, 52 N. E. 750 (Ind.), it was held that the
grant of "a free and undisturbed right to the use" of a cerEasement, tain way does not give the grantee a right to an
open Way open way, these words not aniounting to the grant
of an open way. The plaintiff in this case objected to the
placing by the defendant of gates at either end of the way.
The general rule is that the grant of a way does not take
away the right to place gates thereon which the grantee must
open and close when he uses the way. The language* must
be express and explicit to take away this right: Bean v. Coleman, 44 N. H. 539; Short v. Devine, 146 Mass. i19 ; Green
v. Goff, 153 Ill. 534; Hartman v. Fick, 167 Pa. f8; Ko/der
v. Smith, 3 Pa. Super. Ct. 176; Jones on Easements, §§ 400I, 405, 4o6. In Connery v. Brooke, 73 Pa. 8o, the words
"free right of passageway with free ingress and egress at all
times" was held not to imply that a gate across the way
granted was an obstruction.
SALES.

A, a wholesale dealer, shipped goods to B, a retailer,
at various times, the bills being marked, "Consigned; our
He knew that the conRete.ntio.n of property until paid for."
Title,
signee mingled the goods with his general stock,
Judicia of and retailed them in his business when and as he

Ownership

pleased and at his own prices; nor did he require

the latter to make any report of such sales, nor keep any
separate inventory or account of such goods, they being paid
for out of the general *proceeds of the retailer's business.
Held, that A retained no title as against an assignee for creditors of B: Mayer v. Catron (Court of Ch. App. of Tenn.),
48 S. W. 255.

TELEGRAPH COMPANIES.

In an action by A against a telegraph company for damages occasioned by negligence in the transmission of a mes-
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sage, it appeared that the message, when received
ivqo-per
loan by A, was considered by him as of doubtful
of me , meaning, and that he asked the agent of the de-

Tra"w

Cotributory

fendant company if it was correct, and was in-

formed that it had been repeated
and was correct.
Held, that A was not guilty of contributory negligence as a
mitter of law: Hasbrouck v. Western Union Tel. Co. (Supreme Court of Iowa), 77 N. W. 1034.
TRUSTS.
With two dissenting voices the Supreme Court of Missouri
has held that a trustee of a private charity, who becomes
Liability of trustee by virtue of holding a public office, can
Trwtees
appoint another to fulfill the duties of trustee, and,
f the appointment is carefully made, is freed from all further
responsibility for the care of the trust property. Here a testator- directed that $io,ooo should be paid to the judges of
the county court, to invest the same on good security and
apply the proceeds to certain designated charitable purposes.
The judges ordered that the fund be received by the county
treasurer. Successive county treasurers took care of the
property for twenty-five years and made periodical reports to
the court. Then a treasurer was elected who misapplied the
property. Before his election his reputation had been good.
Suit was brought to determine if the judges in office at the
time of the treasurer's misappropriation were liable for the
loss to the trust property. The decision, as indicated, was in
favor of the judges: Anderson v. Roberts, 48 S. W. 847.

WAR"HOUSPMEN.

In New York Trust Co. v. Lipman, 52 N. E. 593, the Supreme Court of New York held that where a warehouse gave
Bailment,
a depositor open, negotiable receipts for bales of
Lien
goods deposited, deliverable only on the return of
the receipts, and, according to their custom, held the number
of bales called for against such receipts without agreeing to
deliver any particular bales, and the depositor, after pledging
the receipts without notice to the pledgee, withdrew the bales
first deposited and replaced them with others of equal value,
the lien of the pledgee was -transferred to the new bales, and
the release of the old bales constituted a valuable consideration for subjecting the new ones, as deposited, to the same lien.

